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CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION. By Horace E. Read and
John W. MacDonald. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1948.
Pp. 1337. $8.50.
PREPARATION of a casebook on legislation, or the conduct of a course in that
field, demands more than ordinary attention to the question of what the
objectives of the course should be. Unless the instructor knows what he is
after and keeps a firm grip on the material, a course in legislation is likely to
wander almost anywhere and hence arrive nowhere. The course is a new-
comer in the law school curriculum and there appears to be no particular
agreement upon what it should attempt to do or how it should be taught.'
Certain of the problems in developing a course in legislation are only too
clear. Legislation, in the sense of statutes passed by legislative assemblies,
constitutes a major portion of the entire body of law. Obviously the statu-
tory material relating to a particular field must be studied as an integral
part of that field; it would be senseless to relegate legislative material to a
general course on "legislation". What, then, is the purpose of the legislation
course? Is it possible to cull out "general principles" applicable to legisla-
tion as a whole which are worth the study of law students? Or should the
course be devoted only to matters of legislative procedure and drafting?
Furthermore, any study of legislation can readily lose touch with reality
and degenerate into useless sterility. In the field of legislative law-making,
the play of political, economic and social forces is particularly strong. Mere
legalistic scrutiny of the final product or the formal record conveys a singu-
larly empty notion of the legislative process. The same is applicable, per-
haps to a less degree, to judicial interpretation of statutes. For this reason
full comprehension of the subject matter requires intensive study of the
particular problem to which the legislation is a response, as well as a clear
insight into the broad "non-legal" elements in the picture. How can a
sense of reality be given to a general course in "legislation"?
Again, legislative drafting-surely a vital segment of a course in legisla-
tion-is an art which can scarcely be transmitted to a student through cases
or other reading materials. What kind of assistance can a casebook give on
this aspect of legislation?
Messrs. Read and MacDonald struggle manfully with these and other
difficulties. Some light on the extent of their success in finding a solution
may be gleaned from a brief summary of their materials.
The book commences with a long introductory chapter on the "growth of
law through the judicial and legislative processes." The opening section
1. Suggestive discussions may be found in Hurst, The Content of Courses in Legts-
lation, 8 U. oF Cmt. L. Rxv. 280 (1941), and Cohen, On the Teaching of Legislation. 47
CoL L. Rv. 1301 (1947).
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contains historical material pointing up the increasing importance of legis-
lation in modem society. This is valuable background, though possibly
treated too summarily. The three succeeding sections-dealing with the
nature and limitations of judicial law-making, early "law-reforming" stat-
utes, and "legislation in aid of the courts"-seem to me of dubious utility.
On the other hand the final section on the origins and development of legis-
lative policy, including the factors and agencies which influence legislative
judgment, is suggestive and valuable. These are matters which go to the
*heart of the legislative process and are, in fact, entitled to more attention
than the authors bestow.
The second chapter treats of legislative organization and procedure. This
job is on the whole well done. But I would suggest two criticisms: first,
that the material on parliamentary procedure is insufficient and does not
give an adequate picture of the actual functioning of a legislative body-
the methods by which its leaders exercise control, tactics of obstruction, the
effect of debate, and similar matters; second, that the material on the in-
vestigatory function of legislative bodies is badly slighted.
The authors then include a chapter on "types of statutes," discussing
various aspects of direct, declaratory, creative and special legislation;
amendments, repeals and codification; uniform laws and interstate compacts.
Some of this material is significant, but much of it concerns minor matters
of statutory interpretation (a subject treated at great length later) and in
general the chapter strikes me as unfruitful and at many points trivial.
A chapter on measures for enforcing legislation, including "effectuation
through administrative agencies," raises squarely the problem of keeping
the course within reasonable bounds. I doubt the wisdom of including such
material. In any event the issues cannot be handled effectively in the space
available. Thus there is little or no data on such vital matters as the stat-
utory injunction, the civil damage suit, requirements of record keeping,
organization, and many other features of the enforcement problem.
Chapter 5 is devoted to "Forms of Law-Making: The Parts of a Statute"
and contains material on the use of bills and resolutions, title, preamble,
enacting clause, definitions, and similar matters. Much of this material is
necessary. But it is questionable whether so much space should be given to
the manifold and detailed problems arising out of differing state constitu-
tions and statutes; the problems of federal legislation in this area are in-
significant. And again much of the material perforce relates to problems of
statutory interpretation having doubtful general relevance.
The next chapter, entitled "Legislative Language, Its Arrangement, and
the Mechanics of Drafting," includes some material on statutory interpre-
tation (particularly canons of construction) and a section on the rule against
vagueness and delegation of legislative power. More valuable is a collection
of writings on the problem of legislative drafting. This material reflects the
practical experience of the authors in working with the Minnesota and New
York legislatures and is one of the best sections of the book.
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The remainder of the book-two chapters totalling over 350 pages-deals
mainly with statutory interpretation. The collection of cases and materials
is good. But the space devoted to the problem, taking into consideration
the material in preceding chapters, appears excessive. And certain sections,
such as those dealing with the weight given to administrative interpretatiol
and with violation of statutes as negligence per se, seem altogether un-
necessary, Moreover, the treatment of statutory interpretation poses a more
basic problem. The authors have chosen to group their materials in the
conventional pattern, the various sections dealing with the "plain meaning
rule," the "mischief rule," the "golden rule," the effect of previous inter-
pretation, reenactment, use of legislative history, presumptions, and sim-
ilar classifications. One is left with the feeling that the study of these de-
vices gives only faint and barren clues to an understanding of the inter-
pretative process. It is suggested that a series of cases dealing with
judicial treatment of a few selected statutes-such as the Mann Act, the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act-would be
equally successful in presenting the various legal devices used or ignored by
the courts and at the.same time would permit the inclusion of political and
economic material that would place the problems in a less abstract and more
realistic atmosphere.
Taking the book as a whole, however, one must give full credit for a
comprehensive and well-documented job. The book represents an enormous
amount of hard work over a long period of time. The materials have been
carefully and thoughtfully chosen. The notes are crammed with citations
so that the volume is an excellent working tool in the study of legislation,
And the non-case material is abundant and suggestive. The ultimate prod-
uct is thoroughly worthwhile and represents a contribution to the field that
certainly outshines all previous efforts.
The major shortcomings that I find have already in large part been in-
dicated. Essentially I would offer two basic criticisms. One is that the
authors have perhaps given insufficient attention to the scope of their effort
and the objectives they seek to attain. The preface alleges that the work
is designed for a course "in the methods of the legislative process and in
judicial techniques of applying statutes in the solution of legal issues."
But the attempted coverage is actually far wider and a substantial pro-
portion of the 1337 pages skims lightly over more distant fields. In addition,
too much of the material concerns details peculiar to a single state jurisdic-
tion. At the same time certain matters, outlined below, are neglected or
omitted entirely.
-The other flaw, at least in my judgment, is that the total result conveys
a somewhat abstract and sterile view of the legislative process. One fails
to obtain from the book a clear appreciation of the function and actual op-
eration of a modern legislative body. There is an absence of the flavor of
practical politics and of the clash of social and economic forces. There is




modem problems,--such as a Federal program for full employment or a
state program for housing. In real life the legislative process is awkward,
unruly and badly integrated with other government functions; the problems
it must solve are complex and pressing. Yet the legislative assembly is the
core of our democratic institutions. A book on legislation should convey
some of the spirit and urgency of this dilemma of modern democracy.
I believe that many of the difficulties just outlined could be avoided, and
valuable advantages gained, by a somewhat different approach. In my judg-
ment, the law school course in legislation should be built around a study of
the legislature as an institution of government. It should be directed toxard
consideration of the function of the legislature in a highly industrialized
society, the role it is equipped to play, its methods of operation, and the
legal problems involved in the performance of its functions. This would
have the advantage of narrowing the field to more manageable proportions
and affording a clearer insight into the forces at work and the actual prob-
lems of legislative operation. Such an approach could be readily integrated
with the study of executive institutions in the course on administrative proc-
ess and of judicial institutions in the procedure and other traditional courses
of the law school curriculum. It would permit a wider use of social science
materials and facilitate a realistic treatment of the major issues that con-
front our Federal and state legislatures today.
A course of this kind should commence with a study of some of the prob-
lems involved in the election of members to legislative bodies-the basis of
representation, apportionment and reapportionment, restrictions on voting,
rights of new parties, control of corrupt practices, and the like. It should
then move to a consideration of the composition of legislative bodies-the
age, occupation, education, social status, geographic and group representa-
tion, experience, intelligence, and skills of the persons who get themselves
elected to the legislature. Only in the light of such background is it possible
to understand or appraise the working of our current legislative assemblies.
From here one can begin to appraise the role which the legislature of today
plays and can play in modem government and its relationship to other
institutions of government.
The student should then proceed to consider the forces in our society
which underlie and influence legislative action. This involves a study of
pressure groups, public opinion, the impact of political parties, the part
played by the chief executive and the administrative bureaucracy, and the
other factors which condition the operation of the legislature.
The investigatory function of the modem legislature is certainly deserving
of more attention than it has usually been accorded. The methods by which
a legislature obtains information, its function as public investigator, its role
in supervising the bureaucracy, possible limitation on the powers and pro-
cedures of legislative committees, are all matters of growing significance.
With respect to the law-making function of the legislature the student
should be acquainted with the organization and procedure of legislative as-
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semblies, including methods of maintaining leadership, the committee sys-
tem, tactics of obstruction, the use of the veto, judicial review of legislative
procedure, and similar matters. Next should come a consideration of certain
major problems in framing a statute, covering such issues as the rule against
vagueness, private and special legislation, the role of legislative findings, as
well as technical requirements of title, single subject matter and the like.
Statutory interpretation, of course, requires some attention. But I be-
lieve this can be somewhat de-emphasized, and considered primarily from
the viewpoint of its relation to statutory drafting. Training in drafting on
the other hand should be a matter of major concern. As already indicated
this requires mainly actual practice, and the contribution to be made by
reading cases or other materials is a limited one. The course could well con-
clude with a consideration of the various proposals for reform and rejuvena-
tion of legislative bodies.
All of the foregoing material should be presented in the context of the
political, economic, social and psychological forces which shape our current
legislation. The use of specific case studies-such as the operation of the
Committee on Un-American Activities or the legislative struggle to pass the
Employment Act of 1946-can readily be used to give life and color to the
course.
This outline is necessarily couched in general and sketchy terms, But I
believe it presents the framework of a course which would furnish to the
future practicing lawyer, government servant, political scientist or average
lawyer-citizen a valuable initiation into a critical area of modern govern-
ment.
THomAS I. EmERSONt
THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY. By Sebastian De Grazia. Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1948, Pp. xx, 258.
WE have taken things too easy. In liberalism as well as in socialism we
have put all emphasis on the hoped-for improvement of conditions which,
in a more or less far-away future, might lead to the restoration of those
community values whose loss we darkly feel as a threatening thing; con-
servativism, on the other hand, merely bewails this loss without knowing
what to do about it. But, even supposing that it is not utopian to assume
that, in an age of specialization and of increasingly totalitarian organiza-
tion of state and society, the lost early "community" will be restorable, there
is the problem whether we can afford to wait until "conditions" have been
changed. Can the sense for cultural and communal values be put on ice with-
out turning into that "ice cream" evaluation of values of the famous GI, who
referred to the soda fountain of the home-town drugstore as the embodiment
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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of the democracy he was fighting for? Perhaps it is unfair to ridicule this
standard. After all, it merely states in honest terms what more highly placed
spokesmen for present-day civilization couch in highsounding but empty
phrases. However this may be, there is real danger in the loss of a sense for
cultural and communal values which threatens both the individualistic
society of the entrepreneurial nexus and the socialized society of the bureau-
cratic status.
In the footsteps of Guglielmo Ferrero (who, strangely, is never mentioned
by the author of the present book) and others, there has recently been some
revival of concern for what keeps society together; some concern, for in-
stance, for the import of authority and legitimacy of rulership and of belong-
ing to a group. Now comes De Grazia and bestows upon us a full-fledged
theory of the Political Community. The objective of his study, as he tells
us, was "to arrive at a theory of anomie and thus at a systematized set of new
hypotheses on the causes and consequences of the disintegration of political
belief-systems." (P. xiv). The concept of anomie, borrowed from Emile
Durkheim, literally means normlessness or rulelessness and is used by the
author to describe a feeling of isolation from the group, created by men's
breakdown of faith in the existence or the power of their "rulers". "A po-
litical community exists among men who regard each other as brothers. But
they will not think of themselves as a brotherhood until they have and avow
filial love and faith for their ruler and for their God. If they have no faith
in their rulers or if they allow opposing directives to sway them from the
commandment of love for their fellowmen, they have no political commu-
nity; they have anomie." (P. 189).
Why is "faith in the ruler" and having a "directive of love" so fundamen-
tal? The basic reason is psychological: men are born dependent on others
and in early childhood already experience that "separation andety" which
can be overcome only through belief in a protecting "ruler" (parent in the
family, later political ruler in the political community), a ruler who regulates
the environment for their benefit through "cooperative directives." The
rise, in our society, of a different type of value-system or directive, namely,
a "competitive" one, where horo is zonini lupus instead of being fellov in
the protected group, leads to what the author calls "simple" and "acute"
anomie. "Simple" anomie is the feeling of general confusion and pointless-
ness which stems from contradictory belief-systems, and from which man
tries to escape in various ways. Thus the "community" experience of war
is shown to offer an escape from peacetime anomie in a rationalized and
mechanized business society. "Acute" anomie occurs when the "ruler"
disappears, as through death, or when belief in his power or legitimacy
vanishes, as during a depression. Acute anomie may drive men, individually,
into suicide or insanity, or, collectively, into joining "messianic" movements
of religious or political character. The only remedy, as the author sees it, is
in the restoration of genuine political community, where the cooperative
directive replaces the competitive one; then only will man be citizen.
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De Grazia's certainly is an attempt in the grand manner to provide a new
and more "scientific" foundation for political science, an attempt which fills
one with admiration not only for its broad sweep but also for the brilliance of
countless bold insights and striking formulations. And yet, this reviewer
has read the book twice from cover to cover but has been left bewildered.
Somehow the book does not "come off." It comes close to but fails fully to
attain its author's goal. A few points may illustrate this.
There is first what may be called the monomanical nature of the theory,
its exclusive reliance on "psychological materialism" (if a parallel to "eco-
nomic materialism" is permitted). Like other theories of a "unique factor"
it explains too much in history and society by one factor, here the psy-
chological one. For example: when asking himself why, in the history of
American labor, the last decades of the nineteenth century were the only ones
of violence and near-revolution, the author's explanation is in the estrange-
ment of workers from their "rulers", the leaders in business, who at that
time gave up indigenous habits in favor of imitating foreign manners; when
this ceased, labor recovered from separation anxiety and ensuing anomie.
One may agree with the author in many of his observations and also in his
rejection of the theory according to which economic conditions, especially
poverty, are the cause of social revolt (another theory of the "unique fac-
tor"!), and yet doubt whether he has hit upon a more adequate explanation.
In the instance referred to, did not economic and political factors play at
least a comparable role? And why did not the entire non-French Europe
of the eighteenth century, with its upperclass adopting French culture and
customs at least as much as the Gilded Age aped the British, suffer from
anomie, with ensuing revolts? But it was the French who did revolt eventu-
ally, and that at a time when their upper class, romantically, tried to "go
native"!-quite contrary to what De Grazia's theory would lead us to ex-
pect. Another example: The cause of the low suicide rate among Catholics,
as compared with Protestants, according to the author is in the Catholic's
lesser "psychological investment in the business systems of belief" (p. 170),
because this means less of an "anomic" feeling of contradiction between
the cooperative and competitive directives. Surely there is a more obvious
explanation in that Catholic law and ethics make suicide a grave sin.
Furthermore: The basic psychological concept of "separation anxiety"
seems too narrow, and the general "anomic" situation, as described by the
author, seems too broadly defined to make the connection between the two
convincing. Is not the basic psychological situation, as Durkheim's own
definitions would indicate, "insecurity" in the sense of uncertainty about
values and standards, rather than "isolation" from the group? And is sep-
aration anxiety really the only fundamental inclination in the child and
later? Is it not rather supplemented by an opposite urge, provoked by too
much normative restriction, an urge toward freedom from familial and so-
cietal restrictions, which, if suppressed, may lead to equally important,
though different, anxieties and frustrations? Disregard of this factor may
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account for the author's considering as satisfactory "belief systems" (those
which "perform their psychological function": p. 26) only those that satisfy
the urge for togetherness in the group under rulership. Is conformism the
only solution? Are there no possible belief systems and directives which
would allow for individual self-reliance and autonomy without, at the same
time, producing anomie? This is important, because, if the author is right,
the only "solution" would be in the "return to the womb," or the "shortly
thereafter," the individual's merging in the group under the recognized ruler,
through what the author calls the abolition of the competitive directive and
the restoration of the "community of love" and cooperation. But is not
this the cherished utopia of those who disregard the actualities connected
with power and competition in the world and, in addition, overlook the op-
pressive potentialities of "community" systems? In fact, there is a danger
of the author's conclusions (regardless of his intentions, which certainly are
otherwise) leading right into fascism, which, in essence, is characterized by
the use of community ideology in order to establish in a late, rationalized
society a practice of force and violence. May man never mature?
If the psychological basis thus is too narrow, the socdo-politico-cultural
situations which, according to the author, are caused by it, are too broad to
be easily explained this way; in fact, they are all-comprehensive. As de-
scribed at length on pp. 100 et seq., these "anomic" situations comprise all
the phenomena which are expressive of the rationalization and mechaniza-
tion of modem life and of the ensuing loss of a unified world-view: the
pessimism, Weltsclmerz, and despair of fin de siclc and after, the an.xieties
and frustrations from Kafka to Eliot, cubism in art, atonality in music. All
this as result of "separation anxieties"? In addition, too much of what looks
like real "community" spirit is interpreted as mere "adaptation to simple
anomie": romantic love, friendship, idealization of the home and family
life, membership in clubs. Does not the very abundance of these phenomena,
at least in part, attest to modem man's capacity here to find in cooperation
a life that, to some extent, overcomes the reasons for anomie? Our world, it
would appear, is not quite as devoid of cooperative possibilities and actualities
as the author wants us to believe; an earlier, more rigid pattern is merely re-
placed by a more voluntary, fluid one.
What De Grazia's view boils down to, then, is a new version of the time-
honored theory of society's development from Gemeinschaft to GeselIscthaft,
from a Speriglerian early stage of "organic" community to the late stage of
rationalized "civilization", from "status" to "contract"; all this super-
imposed upon a theory according to which the psychological requirements
of homo sapiens, or rather of 7wmo gregarius, agree with the early stage but
not with the later one. Again: Is there no psychological foundation for a
more individualistic, rulerless though not ruleless, stage?
And finally: Exactly as in his study of causes the author seemed to over-
emphasize the psychological factor, for his solutions he dwells too exclusively
upon belief systems as such, on contradictions between them, or their in-
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ability to satisfy psychological wants. He thinks that abolishing one set of
"directives", replacing one ideology with another, would be sufficient
to solve the problem of anomie and all that is connected with it. Thus, re-
ferring to a future community, he suggests: "Such a community does not re-
quire a new set of institutions for economic life but that a new, a less con-
flict-laden, a purer spirit should move men. It does not ask that people quit
all competitive behavior. .. ." etc. (p. 191). The question arises: Do not
many of the difficulties, and anomies, stem rather from conflicts between
ideologies and actual conditions than from conflicts between ideologies as
such? As the author himself shows for the case of Protestant work ethics
and its relation to the ethics of capitalism, belief systems often adapt them-
selves successfully to apparently contradictory systems and transform even
competitive directives into ideologies of harmony of interests and public
benefit. But the conflict situation remains. It continues to arise from basic
social constellations such as the family father's, who as businessman "has"
to act ruthlessly in the interest of the family and the firm, or the statesman's,
who "has" to act ruthlessly in foreign affairs in the interest of his country;
all this, despite ever so "cooperative" directives, because of the security
dilemma with which competitive and power actualities confront men and
groups. Would not such conflicts and dilemmas, rather than conflicting
ideologies, give rise to guilty feelings, anxieties, and similar "anomies"?
rhe ensuing problems, far from being solved by the mere introduction of
more "cooperative" ideology, might even require for their solution some
precaution against too high a prevalence of the group spirit, a fight against too
much of that authority of "rulers" and that prestige of their "directives"
which De Grazia wants to restore as basis of the genuine Political Commu-
nity. How to chart a course between such opposed sets of requirements
remains the unsolved problem.
It is customary that a reviewer, after voicing considerable objections,
concludes with asserting politely that his criticism should "in no way detract
from the value of the book under review." In so doing the present reviewer
would like emphatically to state that he really means it. This book belongs
among the few valuable publications which have appeared in recent years
in the field of social and political theory. Ours is not only an "anomic" but
also an anaemic age with respect to creative thought. And since, toward the
end of his book, the author seems to give us the promise of another book,
"to follow in the traditions of political science set by Plato and Campanella,"
our criticism may well turn out to have been mere anticipation and im-
patience. At any rate, a subsequent volume will be warmly welcomed by
anybody concerned about the present and future of our Political Commu-
nity.
JOHN H. HERZt
t Professor of Government, Howard University.
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THE POLLSTERS, PUBLIC OPINIOX, POLITICS AND D -iocrATIc LEADERsIP.
By Lindsay Rogers. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. Pp. xi, 239.
POLITIC-IL theory and the pollsters' scientific body of doctrine seem to be
dwelling on different planes. Our modern institutions of applied social
science in their "dynamic social research" do not willingly delve into as-
sumedly marginal problems of meaning which may arouse doubt as to the
significance, if not the validity, of the polling endeavors. In turn, many of
our commercial pollsters ' are inclined to take a sanguine view of the po-
tentialities inherent in their activities and techniques; they are prone to
make polls appear as a device indispensable for the proper functioning of
democratic institutions.
The chief merit of Professor Rogers' gay little book is that it places in
proper perspective the polls' limitations as a prop for the democratic proc-
ess. Applied social scientists may argue, with some measure of justice, that
Rogers' refutation of the chances of measurement in the social sciences
oversimplifies the issues; that most of the methodological shortcomings of
commercial pollsters are not necessary weaknesses of political polling; and
that such shortcomings can be and already have been overcome through the
pollsters' arduous and extensive research. All this may be admitted without
detracting from the merit of the book. Even if the optimum accuracy of the
polls were established, Professor Rogers' major thesis still would stand.
Only in a very limited sphere are results of the polls consequential; states-
men certainly are on their own when it comes to making political decisions
though they possibly may draw some limited profit from listening to the
inchoate voice of the polls.
The election prediction proper, as handled by the pollsters, calls for seri-
ous critique. Professor Rogers appropriately points to the pollsters' "ig-
norance of the political world in which we live." 2 If this point is granted, the
main value of election predictions would be less in their predictive value than
in the opportunity offered the pollster community for checking and verify-
ing procedures, for studying the importance of political issues and campaign
devices, and for providing evidence in support of this or that thesis as to what
determines voters' reactions. As far as the public is concerned, however,
election predictions are not entirely a harmless game because of their pos-
sible bandwagon effect. The public at large draws less benefit from the game
than the Greeks did from their oracles. Whereas the oracles' answers to
1. "Commercial pollsters" here stands for organizations predominantly engaged in
selling service in the measurement of the public's reaction to consumer goods, -ales meth-
ods and promotional activities. The very same pollster organizations, in order to keep
their names before the eyes of the services' potential buyers, also, as a less profitable
sideline, sell election predictions and other public opinion polls, offering these to news-
papers and periodicals.
2. G. D. H. Cole has recently drawn renewed attention to the difference b~tvxeen
men's concepts of their probable action under hypothetical circumstances and their actual
behavior in a concrete situation demanding action. 20 PormrrcA QuArsmay 71 (1949).
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queries always were framed in such a way as to allow the subsequent con-
clusion that at least vague vistas of future happenings had been opened up,
election polls at best supply a short term forecast wherein, of the many
things that may shape the future, just one is surveyed and outlined with a
number of more or less pertinent data.
Outside the range of election forecasts, Professor Rogers distinguishes be-
tween those narrow fields to which the pollsters either are tied by a direct
community interest or in which they have had a chance of acquiring personal
experience on which to base reactions, and the uncharted sea of general
opinions in regard to any variety of political problems. With respect to the
former, polls, under certain circumstances, may serve as guideposts for po-
litical action, even though the scope of new insight should not be overes-
timated. One may exemplify Professor Rogers' reasoning by the case of
polls designed to gauge workers' reactions to the Taft-Hartley 'Act. Re-
actions were rather hazy at a time of relatively full employment and good
business prospects; more sharply defined reactions may be anticipated in a
deteriorating economic situation when the impact of legislation on individ-
ual destinies would be more strongly felt by the respondents. But even then
politicos would be likely to learn from polls only something they had known
all along. Increasing awareness of the implications of the Taft-Hartley Act
among worker interviewees possibly would intensify the activities of the
labor unions with respect to this particular piece of legislation but surely
would not change the unions' basic attitude.
As compared with polls on specific community problems or pressing
social problems of our daily existence (socialized medicine, rent legislation,
etc.) polls on more generalized political questions such as disarmament,
peace, foreign relations, would seem subject to still greater doubt. The
public's lack of familiarity with the problems involved and their ramifica-
tions, absence of intensive interest and the failure of the public to arrive
at coherent conclusions from logically closely related issues rob the polls'
results of much of their probative value.
All this, I think, need not imply that the public at large lacks any ideas,
vague and general though they may be, as to preferable forms of social and
political development. To the extent that it is technically possible within
the framework of traditional political institutions, the public does express
such preferences in the choice of candidates for political office. But choosing
a candidate is only indirect and insecure participation in decisions on in-
dividual issues. And yet, attempts at improving the situation through
having specific issues submitted to the public by way of official referenda or
unofficial polls have not proven a singularly effective method of widening
the scope of the democratic process. The public's lack of experience and
interest, and obvious failure to relate the issues under consideration to in-
dividual patterns of political preferences, have discouraged even honest
friends of direct democracy; direct democracy would seem to produce max-
imum technical results only when applied under conditions of great political
[Vol. 581424
1949] REVIEVS 1425
sophistication or rigid class formation. And such conditions, historically
speaking, have been less than conducive to maintaining social equilibrium.
The notion that polls ever could play the role of a foolproof transmission
belt between the will of the people and political action is among the bizarre
pipedreams of our mechanically minded age. Dispelling that notion, Pro-
fessor Rogers implicitly suggests that-"manque de mieux"-w-we turn again to
representative institutions, where polls may be taken under advisement, but
where decisions will be made according to the representatives' and the political
leadership's own light. I hope Mr. Rogers will allow me to retain his con-
clusions as to the polls without my having to underwrite his alternative
"en attendant un supplement d'information."
OTTo KIRcHUMILRt
-f U. S. Department of State.
